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Article

Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride
Circuit Again
David R. Stras†
“[W]e shall have these gentlemen as judges of the Supreme
Court . . . not mingling with the ordinary transactions of business—not accustomed to the ‘forensic strepitus’ in the courts below—not seeing the rules of evidence practically applied to the
cases before them—not enlightened upon the laws of the several
States, which they have finally to administer here, by the discussion of able and learned counsel in the courts below—not
seen by the people of the United States—not known and recognized by them—not touching them as it were in the administration of their high office—not felt, and understood, and realized
as part and parcel of this great popular Government; but sitting
here alone—becoming philosophical and speculative in their inquires as to law—becoming necessarily more and more dim as
to the nature of the law of the various States, from want of familiar and daily connection with them—unseen, final arbiters
of justice, issuing their decrees as it were from a secret chamber—moving invisibly amongst us, as far as the whole community is concerned; and, in my judgment, losing in fact the ability
to discharge their duties as well as that responsive confidence of

† Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
is grateful to Arthur Hellman, Toby Heytens, Tim Johnson, Heidi Kitrosser
and Ryan Scott for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. This
Article also benefited from the excellent research assistance provided by Dan
Ellerbrock, Ivan Ludmer, and Shaun Pettigrew. I would also like to specially
thank Karla Vehrs, with whom I first discussed this topic two years ago and
who urged me to write this Article despite my decision to write on a different
topic one year ago for the Minnesota Law Review Symposium. In addition, I
would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Editorial Board of Volume 91
of the Minnesota Law Review for providing me with a forum for this Article,
and for selecting me as their faculty advisor. I note that this Article was accepted for publication prior to my appointment as faculty advisor. Copyright
© 2007 by David R. Stras.
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the people, which adds so essentially to the sanction of all acts of
the officers of Government.”1
Supreme Court Justices have not “ridden circuit”2 for approximately one hundred years,3 but the admonition of Senator
George Badger rings as true today as it did when Congress considered eliminating circuit riding in 1848. Today’s Justices
spend roughly nine months a year cloistered in the Supreme
Court building in Washington, D.C., making decisions and issuing opinions on some of the most important issues of the day.4
Many people are unfamiliar with how the Court makes decisions, its relationship to the other branches of government, or
even what types of cases it hears. Indeed, the vast majority of
Americans cannot even name a single Supreme Court Justice.5
As several commentators have noted, the Supreme Court is arguably the most remote and secretive branch of government, at
least insofar as its internal deliberations are concerned.6 Yet
that was not always the case.
To the contrary, the earliest Justices spent most of their
time outside of Washington, D.C., serving as judges of the circuit courts and conversing with lawyers and citizens.7 Although
1. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 596 (1848) (statement of Senator
George Badger regarding a bill that would have ended the practice of circuit
riding).
2. In this Article, I use the words “ride circuit,” “circuit riding,” “circuit
duties,” and other similar terms interchangeably to refer to the circuit duties
of Justices.
3. See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the
History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1829 (2003). Glick’s Comment, which is a wonderful and thorough discussion of the history of circuit
riding, provided me with a valuable starting point and bibliography for my research.
4. See The Supreme Court, Not Ducking, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2004, at
30, 30.
5. See James Bovard, Ignorance Puts Our Freedom at Risk: Uninformed
and Uninterested, Americans Make It Easy for Leaders to Grab More Power,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 24, 2006, at 25; Greg Pierce, Insider Politics: Court Polls, WASH. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A6 (citing a Findlaw poll that
found that “nearly two-thirds of Americans couldn’t name a single current
U.S. Supreme Court justice”).
6. See Matthew D. Bunker, Supreme Court Justices Recoil at Being Stars
of Reality TV, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, April 6, 2003, at C4; Inside the Court, N.J.
REC., Mar. 8, 2004, at L6.
7. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks
(Oct. 6, 2000), in 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2002). In fact, during the
first two Terms, there were no cases on the Supreme Court’s docket and the
duties of the Justices consisted only of riding circuit. See Glick, supra note 3,

STRAS_6FMT

1712

6/15/2007 10:56:18 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1710

circuit riding was burdensome and even dangerous in light of
the difficult travel conditions during the formative years of the
nation,8 it led to a “relationship of camaraderie and respect” between the Justices and local citizens, judges, and members of
the bar.9 The accessibility of the Justices to the general public
was one of the chief reasons why circuit riding was not formally
abolished until 1911,10 despite repeated attempts by some
members of Congress and the Court to eliminate it.11
This Article demonstrates that many of the arguments favoring circuit riding during this nation’s early years are equally
apt today. Circuit riding was important because it exposed Justices to life outside of Washington and brought them closer to
the general citizenry. A modern form of circuit riding would ensure that Justices gain exposure to a wider array of legal issues, the laws of various states, and the difficulties faced by
lower courts in implementing the Court’s sweeping (and sometimes confounding) rulings. A renewal of circuit riding would
confer additional, new benefits as well: empirical evidence
tends to show that increasing the workload of the Justices
would encourage them to retire in a timely manner, prior to the
onset of mental or physical infirmity.12
On the other hand, many of the arguments against circuit
riding, including the crushing caseload faced by the Court following the Civil War,13 are no longer barriers for the modern
at 1764.
8. Many of the early Justices traveled from Washington, D.C. to the circuit courts by means of a stick gig, which was “a wooden chair supported on
two wheels and two shafts and pulled by one horse.” See Leonard Baker, The
Circuit Riding Justices, 1977 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 63, 63.
9. Id. at 67.
10. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1799, 1800, 1809, 1829. The Judiciary Act
of 1801, popularly known as the “Midnight Judges Act,” briefly eliminated circuit riding. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed by
Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132). Less than one year later, however, the
Jeffersonian Republicans, who by then controlled both houses of Congress, repealed the Midnight Judges Act and reestablished circuit riding. See Act of
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
11. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1799, 1804–05, 1807–09.
12. See David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1435–37 (2006); see also David R. Stras & Ryan W.
Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1397, 1455–59 (2005) (proposing a “Golden Parachute” for Supreme Court
Justices in order to encourage them to retire before becoming mentally or
physically infirm).
13. The number of signed opinions issued by the Supreme Court rapidly
expanded from 128 in 1866 to 298 by 1887. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
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Court. The elimination of the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988 has granted the Court broad—
indeed nearly unlimited—discretion in deciding what cases deserve plenary review.14 Following the passage of that law, the
plenary docket has decreased from 141 signed opinions in 1988
to just seventy-four signed opinions during October Term 2003,
which is the lowest output for the Court since 1865.15 Besides
the Court’s shrinking docket, the country’s modern transportation system means that Justices no longer face the danger and
delay accompanying transcontinental travel.
Part I describes the storied history of circuit riding, with
particular emphasis on its advantages and disadvantages. It
tracks circuit riding from its creation in the Judiciary Act of
1789 through its abolition in the Judicial Code of 1911.16 An
examination of its history, and specifically its advantages and
drawbacks, is essential to determining whether circuit riding
should be revived today.
Part II begins by arguing that none of the policy objections
that led to the abandonment of circuit riding are germane today. Focusing on the historical advantages of circuit riding,
Part II further explains that a modern form of circuit riding
would incorporate many of the advantages envisioned and discussed by the framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Part II then
proposes the first modern circuit riding statute, The Circuit
Riding Act of 2007, which would require Justices to spend approximately five days per year hearing oral arguments with a
panel of one or more of the U.S. courts of appeals. After setting
forth the proposed statute, Part II evaluates and compares it
with the circuit riding plan recently proposed by Professor Steven Calabresi and David Presser, which would require Justices
to spend four weeks per year performing the work of federal
district court judges.17 While interesting, Calabresi and
Presser’s plan is neither practical nor tailored to the strengths
and competencies of the Justices. Instead, a plan such as the
Circuit Riding Act of 2007, which requires the Justices to serve
as appellate judges, encompasses neither of those drawbacks
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 232–36 tbl.3-3 (4th
ed. 2007).
14. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
15. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–35 tbl.3-3.
16. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
17. See Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit
Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1388–89 (2006).
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and shares many, if not all, of the advantages of Calabresi and
Presser’s proposal. Finally, Part II addresses the policy and
constitutional objections to the Circuit Riding Act of 2007.
I. THE STORIED HISTORY OF CIRCUIT RIDING
A. THE BIRTH OF CIRCUIT RIDING
The formidable task of creating a national judiciary was
left to the nation’s First Congress, which in 1789 enacted the
first Judiciary Act.18 That Act established a Supreme Court
composed of six Justices,19 three circuit courts,20 and thirteen
district courts.21 In contrast to the district courts, which were
solely courts of first instance,22 the circuit courts exercised the
functions of both a trial23 and an appellate24 court. The Judiciary Act of 1789, moreover, created three judicial circuits: the
eastern, middle, and southern circuits.25 While Congress cre-

18. WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 3 (1990).
19. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73.
20. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75.
21. See id. §§ 2–3, 1 Stat. at 73.
22. See, e.g., id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (assigning district courts jurisdiction
over federal criminal prosecutions where the punishment did not exceed thirty
lashes, one hundred dollars, or six months imprisonment); id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77
(giving district courts jurisdiction over all suits “against consuls or vice consuls”); id. (granting jurisdiction to the district courts over “all suits at the common law where the United States sue[s]” and the matter in dispute exceeds
one hundred dollars).
23. See, e.g., id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (assigning the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction over criminal matters within the district court’s jurisdiction
and exclusive jurisdiction over all other federal crimes); id. at 78 (granting circuit courts jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in
equity,” where “an alien is a party, or the suit is between the citizen of the
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state”).
24. See, e.g., id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 83 (giving appellate jurisdiction to circuit
courts in “causes of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in
dispute exceeds the sum or value of three hundred dollars”); id. § 22, 1 Stat. at
84 (permitting a “writ of error” from the district courts in civil actions exceeding “the sum or value of fifty dollars”).
25. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. The states of Maine and Kentucky were
not included in the original circuit court system, and instead the district
courts in each of those states exercised the jurisdiction, “except of appeals and
writs of error,” of both the district and circuit courts. See id. § 10, 1 Stat. at
77–78. Decisions of the Kentucky district court could be appealed to the Supreme Court in cases where the amount in controversy exceeded two thousand
dollars, see id. §§ 10, 22, 1 Stat. at 77–78, 84–85, and decisions of the Maine
district court could be appealed to the circuit court for Massachusetts, see id.
§ 10, 1 Stat. at 78.
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ated one district judgeship for the district court in each state,26
it did not establish separate circuit judgeships to staff the circuit courts. Instead, each three-judge circuit court included one
local district judge and two Supreme Court Justices.27 The Judiciary Act of 1789, therefore, required Justices to ride circuit,
which involved traveling from state to state in order to hold circuit court in each district within a circuit twice annually.28
Perhaps the primary reason for the creation of the circuit
court system was its low cost, as compared to establishing a
separate tier of appellate judges to staff an intermediate appellate court.29 By using Supreme Court Justices and district
judges to hold circuit court, the First Congress avoided the expense associated with adding another set of circuit court judges
to the nation’s payroll, which many perceived as too inflated already.30 In addition, the circuit courts reduced the substantial
costs involved for litigants who otherwise would have been required to appeal a district court’s judgment to a geographically
distant Supreme Court.31 Accordingly, the circuit courts conserved substantial resources for both the newly formed government and litigants appearing before the federal courts, an
advantage that appealed to both the Federalists and the AntiFederalists.32

26. See id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 73.
27. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. A quorum of two judges of the circuit
court was sufficient to conduct business. Id. However, in any case in which the
circuit court was sitting in appellate review of a decision of the district court,
the district judge could not vote on the appeal but could “assign the reasons”
for his decision. Id.
28. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75.
29. See Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear
Their Influence on State Objects”: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 306
(1987).
30. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster,
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 130 (“It is plausible, even likely, that nothing more
lies behind this feature of the judicial system than a close-fisted Connecticut
concern to get value for money.”).
31. See Holt, supra note 29, at 306; William Paterson’s Notes on the Judiciary Bill Debate and Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill (June 22–23, 1789),
reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 410, 410–
13 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (noting that circuit court judges would meet
“every citizen in his own State” and “carry Law to [citizen’s] [h]omes, to their
very [d]oors”).
32. See Holt, supra note 29, at 306 n.18 (discussing Federalist and AntiFederalist sentiments on the expenses associated with a national judiciary).
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As the country grew larger and wealthier, the costs of staffing an additional layer of courts became less of a concern. In
contrast, one factor that was repeatedly mentioned during initial debates about circuit riding, and then throughout discussions about its possible abolition in the nineteenth century, was
the value of exposing Justices to viewpoints, customs, and laws
outside of Washington, D.C.33 Circuit riding fostered Justices’
familiarity with the local issues facing citizens and members of
the bar throughout the country.34 It also ensured that the Justices remained connected to the laws of a number of states,
which was essential for both conducting the circuit courts and
for Supreme Court review of claims involving state law.35 In
addition to enhancing familiarity with local laws, circuit court
responsibilities kept the Justices aware of significant state
court rulings that the Court could be called upon to review under the Judiciary Act of 1789.36
Circuit riding also provided a unique opportunity for the
education and persuasion of local citizens about the benefits
and responsibilities of the new constitutional system.37 It put
Justices directly in contact with local citizens, judges, and
members of the bar, and the camaraderie that developed permitted the Justices to serve as distinguished representatives of
the new federal government.38 In fact, while on circuit, the Justices delivered grand jury charges, which were widely reprinted
33. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1785, 1799–1800, 1804 n.374, 1809 &
n.404, 1816 & n.456 (recounting various debates about circuit riding). During
its inaugural Term, the Supreme Court met in the Royal Exchange Building in
New York City. See ROBERT J. WAGMAN, THE SUPREME COURT: A CITIZEN’S
GUIDE 41 (1993).
34. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
35. See William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court,
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (discussing Blunt’s Lessee v. Smith, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 248 (1822), in which the Supreme Court decided whether the lower
court had properly instructed the jury under North Carolina and Tennessee
law).
36. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress authorized a writ of error to the
Supreme Court from a decision of the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had in three circumstances: (1) where a federal statute, treaty, or
authority was found invalid; (2) where a state statute or authority was upheld
against a challenge based on the Constitution, federal statute, or treaty; and
(3) where a federal title, right, privilege, or exemption was specifically claimed
or set up and then denied. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.
37. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 19 (1928); Holt,
supra note 29, at 307–08.
38. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1759–60.
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in newspapers, to lecture citizens “on the nature of centralized
government, the responsibility of the citizenry, and the ways in
which the new government served their needs.”39 Local citizens
enjoyed watching the Justices perform their circuit duties, providing a positive impression of the newly created federal
courts.40
Another advantage of circuit riding was its important contribution to the administration of justice in the new federal
court system. As opposed to the district courts, the jurisdiction
of the circuit courts was wide ranging41 and involved some of
the most important cases and divisive legal questions facing
the new Republic.42 By ensuring that one or more Justices participated in the resolution of each case before the circuit courts,
circuit riding improved public confidence in the outcome of individual cases and in the legitimacy of the circuit courts more
generally.43
Finally, circuit riding enhanced the uniformity of federal
law,44 which was an important consideration in light of the nation’s less than satisfactory experience under the Articles of
Confederation. Such uniformity was especially imperative in
the maritime field, where the “need for a body of law applicable
throughout the nation was recognized” as essential to effective
commerce.45 By involving Justices in the decisions made by the
circuit courts, local pressures rarely carried the day,46 and uniform outcomes among the district courts were more common
because of the Justices’ recurring contact with local district
judges.47
39. Id. at 1760.
40. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 8, at 67 (discussing the positive impression
left by Chief Justice Marshall’s appearance in the circuit court of Richmond,
Virginia).
41. See Holt, supra note 29, at 305–06.
42. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 29 (2003); Holt, supra note 29, at
307.
43. See Holt, supra note 29, at 307.
44. Id. at 308.
45. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 7.
46. It is not the case that local pressures never unduly influenced the decisions of the circuit courts. Leonard Baker recounts one instance in which a
circuit court decision involving Justice Story ruled against a ban on imports
from Great Britain based on “‘New England antiwar sentiment.’” Baker, supra
note 8, at 67 (quoting GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY & THE RISE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 97 (1970)).
47. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1761.
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B. THE BURDENS OF CIRCUIT RIDING AND ITS TEMPORARY
ABOLITION
Despite the high hopes and good intentions of the First
Congress, circuit riding was difficult in light of the means of
transportation available in the late 1700s. For the Justices, it
meant “bouncing thousands of miles over rutted, dirt roads in
stagecoach, on horseback, and in stick gigs to bring the federal
judiciary system to the American communities strewn along
the Eastern seaboard.”48 The task was even more burdensome,
and even dangerous, for Justices riding through the southern
circuit, which “required long trips through rough, unpopulated,
and even unknown terrain at times in unpredictably nasty
weather with lodging uncertain and often unpleasant.”49 The
Justices assigned to the southern circuit had to travel nearly
two thousand miles a year under these conditions,50 and it often took six months or more for them to complete their circuit
duties.51 To make matters worse, the Justices were forced to
pay for their own travel and lodging while on the road.52
To say that most Justices disliked circuit riding would be
an understatement. Between 1789 and 1799, two Supreme
Court Justices (Justice Johnson and Justice Blair) resigned
their positions due to the difficulties associated with circuit riding, while two others (Chief Justice Jay and Justice Rutledge)
left to pursue positions in state government.53 Robert Harrison,
meanwhile, declined an appointment to the Supreme Court because he found the duties of a Justice “extremely difficult [and]
burthensome [sic]” as it could result in the “loss of [his] health,
and sacrifice [of] a very large portion of [his] private and domestic happiness.”54 Other Justices, such as James Iredell,
48. Baker, supra note 8, at 63.
49. Glick, supra note 3, at 1765 (internal quotation marks and footnotes
omitted). Indeed, it was not unusual for the Justices to share a room with
complete strangers; Justice Cushing once slept with twelve fellow lodgers, and
Justice Iredell unexpectedly discovered “a bed fellow of the wrong sort” on another trip. See id. at 1765 n.79 (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT 1790–1794, at 3 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988)).
50. See Holt, supra note 29, at 309.
51. Glick, supra note 3, at 1766.
52. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 559 n.29 (1971).
53. Glick, supra note 3, at 1780 n.207.
54. Letter from Robert H. Harrison, Chief Justice of the Gen. Court of
Md., to George Washington, U.S. President (Oct. 27, 1789), reprinted in 1 THE
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were pushed into ill health and even death due in part to the
rigors of circuit riding.55 By all accounts, circuit riding was a
truly miserable part of the job.
Those who remained on the Court complained vigorously
about their circuit duties. Besides writing each other,56 the Justices began corresponding with various political leaders to garner support for the elimination of circuit riding.57 Writing
President Washington, the Justices stated that they found “the
burdens laid upon [them] so excessive that” they could not keep
from “representing them in strong and explicit terms.”58 Attorney General Edmund Randolph agreed with the Justices and
proposed the abolition of circuit riding, but a congressional
committee ignored his recommendation.59 As the Justices became increasingly desperate to rid themselves of the burdens of
circuit riding, they offered to forfeit part of their salary in exchange for the elimination of their circuit duties.60 Congress
eventually granted the Justices partial relief in 1793 when it
passed a law requiring only one Justice to attend each circuit
court,61 but it rejected other efforts by the Justices to make circuit riding less burdensome.62
After the Justices had been riding circuit for more than a
decade, the outgoing Federalist Congress temporarily abolished
the practice in 1801. Shortly after losing the presidential and
congressional elections to the Republicans, but prior to the
transfer of power, the Federalists passed the Judiciary Act of
1801,63 otherwise known as the “Midnight Judges Act.” The Act
abolished circuit riding, reduced the number of Justices on the
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800: APPOINTMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS 36, 36–37 (Maeva Marcus &
James R. Perry eds., 1985).
55. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1391.
56. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 29, at 309 n.28 (quoting Letter from James
Iredell, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thomas Johnson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1792)).
57. See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF
EARLY JUDGES 103 (1997).
58. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 22.
59. Glick, supra note 3, at 1768–69.
60. Id. at 1769–70.
61. Judiciary Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333.
62. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1778. The Justices attempted to alter the
sequence and timing of riding circuit in order to make it less burdensome. Id.
Although Congress partially acquiesced to the Justices’ recommended actions,
it refused to reform the middle circuit.
63. Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
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Supreme Court from six to five, and created six new circuit
courts staffed with sixteen new circuit judges.64 The Act gained
its popular name because President Adams nominated Federalist politicians to fill the new positions on the circuit courts, and
many of them received their commissions on Adams’s last day
in office.65 The passage of the Act and the confirmation of the
new judges caused dissension around the country; Republican
newspapers savagely criticized the Federalists’ actions.66 Despite a vigorous debate about the benefits of eliminating circuit
riding,67 the Republicans repealed the entirety of the Judiciary
Act of 1801 less than one year after it was enacted.68
The repeal of the Midnight Judges Act eventually led to a
constitutional showdown before the Supreme Court when a litigant challenged Chief Justice Marshall’s power to serve as a
circuit judge in Stuart v. Laird.69 After Marshall upheld the
Repeal Act while sitting as a circuit judge, the case reached the
Supreme Court. Former Attorney General Charles Lee, who
argued the case before the Supreme Court, offered four chief
arguments against the Repeal Act. First, he argued that circuit
riding was unconstitutional because it required Justices to hear
the trial of cases that were outside of the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.70 Second, he contended that circuit riding
violated the Appointments Clause because it “impose[d] new
duties” on the Justices, and the addition of these new duties
was inconsistent with their appointment as Supreme Court
Justices.71 Third, he maintained that circuit riding violated a
litigant’s right to have six unbiased Justices decide a case before the Supreme Court.72 Finally, he asserted that the Repeal
Act was unconstitutional because it deprived the newly appointed circuit judges of life tenure, in contravention of Article

64. Id. §§ 6–7, 2 Stat. at 90–91 (repealed 1802).
65. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 188 (1926).
66. Id. One common criticism was that “Adams [wa]s laying the foundation of future faction and his own shame.” Id.
67. See Michael Coblenz, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson,
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy, FED. LAW., Aug. 2006, at 49,
50 (book review).
68. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
70. See id. at 305.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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III, Section 1 of the Constitution.73
The Court disposed of the first three arguments (ignoring
the fourth) in all of 119 words, noting that any constitutional
objection to circuit riding was “of recent date” and that “practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”74 The decision in the case was no doubt influenced by the
political environment at the time, as the Republicans had control of both the executive and legislative branches.75 In upholding the Repeal Act, the Court was able to avoid a bitter showdown with Jefferson.76
C. THE INCREASING BURDENS OF CIRCUIT RIDING AND ITS
ABOLITION
The westward expansion of the United States meant longer
and even more difficult circuit riding trips for the Justices over
rough terrain.77 In 1807, Congress established the Seventh Circuit and added a seventh Supreme Court Justice to staff it.78 In
1837, eight more states were added to the circuit system and
two additional Justices were appointed to sit in the newly created Eighth and Ninth Circuits.79 When Justice Stephen Field
was appointed to the Court in 1863, he was assigned circuit duties for the new Tenth circuit, a trip that took him approximately six weeks to complete.80 Many of the Justices were re73. Id. at 303–04.
74. Id. at 309. I have previously stated that, though Stuart was “abysmally reasoned,” the Court was correct in upholding circuit riding against constitutional challenge. See Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1408.
75. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 195–98
(2005) (suggesting that the outcome of Stuart was based more on a fear of the
Republicans than on a consensus that circuit riding was constitutional).
76. See Coblenz, supra note 67, at 51.
77. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78
IND. L.J. 153, 172 (2003).
78. Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420; Geyh, supra note 77, at 172.
79. See Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176.
80. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1813 & n.437. Justice Stephen Field was
nearly assassinated while riding circuit. David Terry, his former colleague on
the California Supreme Court and a losing litigant before Field’s circuit court,
attempted to kill Justice Field while he was dining on a train. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1890); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at the Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms
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quired to travel more than two thousand miles annually,81 and
their journeys remained hazardous. The roads were often inadequate for their carriages,82 sickness and disease were constant worries,83 and the accommodations were still uncomfortable in many areas.84
In addition to the growing burdens presented by the travel,
the Justices faced a burgeoning docket. The country’s expansion meant an increase in the amount of judicial business, before both the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.85 The number of cases before the Supreme Court nearly doubled from
1803 to 1810,86 and by 1826 the Court was able to dispose of
only thirty-eight out of the 164 docketed cases.87 By 1870, the
Court’s docket had reached 636 cases.88 The mounting workload required the Justices “either to slight their Supreme Court
work with an undue delay in the disposition of appeals or to
slight their circuit work by insufficient attendance on circuit, or
both.”89 As a result, it became increasingly common for circuit
court proceedings to be held by only a single district judge, who
often reviewed his own prior rulings in a case.90
Even though the Justices continued to request relief from
their circuit duties, Congress was slow to respond. Congress
Symposium, in 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2005). Terry was shot by
Deputy U.S. Marshall David Neagle before he could kill Field. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 53. Neagle was eventually indicted for murder, but the Supreme Court later held that he had a federal immunity defense to the prosecution. See Rehnquist, supra, at 1225; Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison,
What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2235–36 (2003).
81. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 49. Justice McKinley
claimed that his circuit duties for the Ninth Circuit, which included Alabama,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, required him to travel approximately
ten thousand miles per year. Id.
82. Glick, supra note 3, at 1806.
83. See id. at 1810 (recounting Justice Daniel’s experience of riding circuit
“through yellow fever at Vicksburg and congestive and autumnal fevers” in
Jackson).
84. See, e.g., id. at 1811 (describing Justice Daniel’s accommodations in “a
beached and converted steamboat where he was housed in a room six feet by
four feet and tormented by Buffalo gnats”).
85. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 34.
86. See id. at 34–35.
87. WARREN, supra note 65, at 676.
88. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 60.
89. Id. at 34.
90. See id. at 87 (“Such an appeal is not from Philip drunk to Philip sober,
but from Philip sober to Philip intoxicated with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a published decision.”).
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partially eased the burden when it passed the Act of June 17,
1844, which required only a single Justice to visit each district
annually to hold circuit court.91 Besides that one piece of legislation, the only assistance from Congress was an occasional extension of the Court’s Term for an additional month, permitting
the Justices to hear a few of the cases that were accumulating
on its increasingly overcrowded docket.92 When the docket became further congested, the Court resorted to self-help, promulgating a rule limiting oral argument to two hours per side.93
According to Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, the new rule
“did something, but not much.”94
Three chief factors contributed to congressional inaction on
circuit riding. First, policymakers had fundamental disagreements about the proper role of the federal judiciary, and these
disagreements led to congressional impotence on a variety of
issues, not just circuit riding.95 Indeed, political delay hampered the resolution of such simple matters as reforming the
circuit system to accommodate newly admitted states.96 The
Civil War made matters worse as many Southerners adamantly opposed any expansion of the federal judiciary,97 and
states’ rights advocates feared that the elimination of circuit
riding would lead to less respect for the states and a greater
number of Supreme Court decisions supporting the assertion of
federal power.98

91. See Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676. The Justices previously
had their circuit riding duties reduced in much the same way under the Act of
1793, which required the Justices to ride circuit within each district only once
per year. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 22. However, when
the country was later divided into six circuits and only a single Justice was
assigned to each circuit, the Justices were once again required to ride circuit
within each district twice annually. Id. at 31–32. But see id. at 32 (explaining
that a provision in the Act of 1793 allowed a single district judge to preside
over the circuit courts, a “provision . . . constantly invoked if circuit courts
were to be held at all”).
92. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726; Act of June 17,
1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676; Act of May 4, 1826, ch. 37, 4 Stat. 160.
93. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 52.
94. Id. at 52.
95. See id. at 80–85 (describing the political discussion about reorganizing
the federal judiciary); Geyh, supra note 77, at 178 (“[D]eveloping and sometimes conflicting notions of judicial independence and accountability had put
Congress in a box that was difficult to escape.”).
96. See Geyh, supra note 77, at 177–78.
97. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 84.
98. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1800.
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Second, there was a general unwillingness to change the
structure of the federal judiciary. Congress was reluctant to reform many aspects of the federal judicial system because it
viewed the Judiciary Act of 1789 as the implementation of the
Framers’ vision of an independent and robust judiciary.99 While
some argued that changes to the judiciary should be treated no
differently than legislation in other areas, “[t]he prevailing
view was that legislation regulating the courts was different,
because it altered the structure of an independent branch of
government, the longstanding stability of which legislators admired and were desirous of preserving.”100 Specifically, the
Midnight Judges Act was a particularly infamous historical
precedent that, in the minds of many legislators, was not to be
repeated.101
Third, many in Congress continued to believe in the genuine advantages of circuit riding. Although some still criticized
circuit riding as outmoded, difficult, and wasteful,102 many others repeatedly voiced their support. In fact, as Washington,
D.C. became less centrally located through westward expansion, policymakers feared that the elimination of circuit riding
would separate the Court from the rest of the nation and that
Justices would become “completely cloistered within the city of
Washington.”103 Many legislators worried that the Court would
become a “fossilized institution,”104 unaware of the business of
the circuits, and that the decisions of the Court would “assume
a severe and local character.”105 Other legislators viewed circuit
riding as critical in keeping Justices knowledgeable about the
practical realities of litigation to ensure that their decisions did
not become too philosophical and unconnected from the communities in which the decisions would be implemented.106
Senator William Allen spoke particularly passionately and eloquently on behalf of the proponents of circuit riding in 1848:
I would admonish those gentlemen, who do not think as I do on these
points, but wish to maintain this Judiciary in its present features,
99. See Geyh, supra note 77, at 171.
100. Id. at 173.
101. See id. at 174–75.
102. See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 123–26 (1819) (describing and rejecting the
arguments against circuit riding); WARREN, supra note 65, at 185–86;
Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1404–05.
103. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 126 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith).
104. Geyh, supra note 77, at 186 (quoting Senator Williams).
105. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 126 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith).
106. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1809.
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that if they do not wish to sound the tocsin, they had better not separate the judges for an hour from circuit duties, and direct intercourse
with the people of the State. That is the only feature in the system
which connects them with the nation; and if that be struck out, the
striking out of the court will follow as naturally as the snuffing of a
candle issues in darkness.107

As the docket continued to expand, however, the pressures
on the Court became so overwhelming that the Justices could
not always attend to their circuit duties. By the 1860s, the Supreme Court’s plenary docket had become a “record of arrears,”
and the lengthy delay before obtaining a hearing and a decision
from the Supreme Court had become unacceptable.108 Congress
was forced to act and passed the Judiciary Act of 1869,109 which
preserved the spirit of circuit riding but eased the burdens imposed on the Justices. The Act created one full-time circuit
judge for each of the nine circuits and reduced the circuit responsibilities of the Justices to just one visit to each district
within a circuit every other year.110 Nonetheless, throughout
the 1880’s many Justices neglected their circuit duties altogether,111 and it became increasingly clear that reform was necessary. Justice William Strong advocated the creation of an intermediate court of appeals, writing that each Justice was
spending approximately eight to twelve hours a day hearing
and deciding cases from the opening of the Term in October until its conclusion in May.112 Chief Justice Morrison Waite too
spoke out on the onerous workload resulting from the Court’s
bloated docket.113
Finally, in 1891, Congress passed a bill sponsored by Senator William Evarts that established an intermediate court of
appeals for the federal judiciary.114 In addition to a new tier of
appellate review, the Evarts Act introduced the concept of dis107. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 595–96 (1848).
108. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 69–70. By 1888, the
Court was nearly three years behind in adjudicating the cases on its plenary
docket. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1650 (2000).
109. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 37, at 45–46.
110. See Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
111. See WARD, supra note 42, at 89.
112. See William Strong, The Needs of the Supreme Court, 132 N. AM. REV.
437, 439 (1881).
113. See Notes, 22 AM. L. REV. 269, 292 (1888) (quoting Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite).
114. See Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
supra note 37, at 100–01.
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cretionary review for the Supreme Court through the writ of
certiorari, and simultaneously granted litigants an appeal as of
right to one of the regional circuit courts of appeals.115 The Act
transformed the Court’s plenary docket; only 275 new cases
were docketed in 1892.116
While neither the old circuit courts nor circuit riding were
formally abolished under the Evarts Act, Justices were no
longer statutorily required to sit as judges of either the old circuit courts or the newly created circuit courts of appeals.117
While some Justices continued to ride circuit, most did not, and
any confusion about the issue was finally dispelled when the
old circuit courts were abolished in 1911,118 formally ending the
storied 120-year history of circuit riding.119
II. A RENEWED CALL FOR CIRCUIT RIDING
A. THE BURDENS AND ADVANTAGES OF A MODERN FORM OF
CIRCUIT RIDING
Although few scholars have focused on the practice of circuit riding,120 it was an important and original component of
the Framers’ vision for an independent judiciary.121 For approximately half of this country’s history, it was a large, perhaps even dominant, component of the job description of Supreme Court Justices.122 Congress ultimately abolished circuit
115. See Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826.
116. See 1893 ATT’Y GEN. ANNUAL REP., at iv; Glick, supra note 3, at 1827.
117. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1828. Under the Act, however, the Justices
were “competent to sit as judges of the circuit court of appeals within their respective circuits.” Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826; Glick, supra
note 3, at 1828.
118. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
119. See Glick, supra note 3, at 1829.
120. See id. at 1753 & n.2 (noting the paucity of research on the issue of
circuit riding). Steven Calabresi and David Presser can be added to that short
list of scholars. See generally Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17 (arguing for
the reintroduction of circuit riding).
121. Many of the legislators who passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 also
signed the U.S. Constitution. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 420 (1821)
(“A contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, certainly of not less authority than that which has been just cited, is the [Judiciary Act of 1789]. We
know that in the Congress which passed that act were many eminent members of the Convention which formed the constitution.”); Tor Ekeland, Note,
Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 1516 (2005).
122. See supra Part I.
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riding, not because it no longer served any purpose, but because of the difficulties and dangers associated with transcontinental travel and because of the crushing caseload faced by
the Supreme Court during the 1880s.123
Neither of those issues is an impediment to a renewal of
circuit riding today. First, today’s transportation system consists of planes, trains, and automobiles, and Justices can travel
across the country by jet plane in just a few hours. The accommodations in even the most remote parts of the country greatly
exceed the standards of lodging available during the 1800s,
when Justices were sometimes forced to share a room with
strangers or even sleep in their stagecoaches.124 The availability of the Internet and telephones in every part of the country
ensures that Justices would be able to vote in time-sensitive
death penalty cases and keep in touch with their chambers during the week in which they are circuit riding. Indeed, some of
the current Justices spend most of their summers away from
Washington, and they are able to keep up with their work from
virtually anywhere in the world without much difficulty.125
Second, the plenary docket is no longer anywhere near the
plateau reached during the mid-1880s. When Congress effectively abolished circuit riding in 1891, the number of signed
opinions released by the Supreme Court over the prior decade
ranged from a low of 232 in 1881 to a high of 298 in 1886.126
Even so, the Court was more than three years behind on its
work.127 Since 1986, by contrast, the Court has been hearing
fewer cases; it issued just seventy-four signed opinions during
both the 2002 and 2003 Terms, a lower output than in any year
since 1865.128 With the elimination of the Supreme Court’s
mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988, the Court has had

123. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1404–05. For a discussion
of the other reasons why circuit riding was abolished, see id. at 1406–08.
124. See id. at 1404; Glick, supra note 3, at 1765 & n.79.
125. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, High Court, Low Profile, BALT. SUN, Aug.
31, 2004, at 15A, available at 2004 WLNR 1472804 (describing Justice
Souter’s summers in New Hampshire); Some Justices Make Summer Busman’s
Holiday, NEWSDAY, Aug. 26, 2002, at A13, available at 2002 WLNR 511032
(discussing Justice Thomas’s trips in his motor home during the summer
months).
126. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–36 tbl.3-3. In contrast, over
the first sixty years of circuit riding, the Supreme Court never even reached
triple digits in the number of signed opinions released annually. See id.
127. See Hartnett, supra note 108, at 1650.
128. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–36 tbl.3-3.
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nearly unlimited discretion in setting the size of its plenary
docket, subject to only a few, nonmaterial exceptions.129 The following chart graphically displays the reduction in the Court’s
plenary docket since 1986, as compared to when circuit riding
was effectively abolished in the late 1800s:130

Number of Opinions

Chart1. Total Number of Signed Opinions Per Term

Supreme Court Term

As the above chart demonstrates, the Court was deciding
more than three times as many cases in the mid-1880s as it
does today. Moreover, as Calabresi and Presser point out, the
primary failing of the old circuit riding system was that it
placed too much “reliance on Supreme Court Justice manpower
to do appreciable quantities of lower court work.”131 Today,
with 651 district judges and 179 circuit judges authorized by
Congress (not including senior judges),132 there are plenty of
judges to handle the caseload, even though dockets have been
steadily rising in the lower federal courts.133 Circuit-riding Jus129. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. The categories of cases over which the Court currently exercises mandatory review add
“very little to the Court’s workload.” See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman,
The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 97
(1989).
130. All data for the chart are derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13,
at 232–36 tbl.3-3.
131. Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1410.
132. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(a), 133(a) (2000).
133. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 86 TEX. L. REV. 947, 964–67 (2007).
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tices would assist the lower courts in keeping up with the demands of their dockets, to be sure, but they would not be required to shoulder the majority, or even an appreciable
amount, of the workload, as was required under the old circuit
court system. Instead, a renewal of circuit riding would be
premised on the considerable advantages it would confer on the
Court, the Justices, and the general public.
The historic support for circuit riding was based largely on
the odious effects of having the Justices confined to Washington, D.C. to perform their work. Representative James Buchanan stated in 1826 that “[i]f the Supreme Court should ever
become a political tribunal, it will not be until the Judges shall
be settled in Washington, far removed from the People, and
within the immediate influence of the power and patronage of
the Executive.”134 Although the judiciary was not intended to
be as political as the legislative or executive branches, the
Framers surely did not intend to isolate it from the general
citizenry either, as even the earliest statements about circuit
riding make clear.135 Citizens may not flock to the circuit courts
to see the Justices in action, as they did during the early years
of circuit riding. But modern circuit riding appearances would
surely provide greater exposure for the Justices and the Court,
similar to the extensive media coverage accompanying the recent visits by Sandra Day O’Connor to the Second, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits.136
Circuit riding would also expose the Justices to judges and
communities with which they are unfamiliar. Many Justices
over the course of history have led cloistered lives, with the
most notable recent example being Justice Souter, who returns
to New Hampshire every summer after the Term ends and
rarely makes public appearances.137 At a minimum, circuit riding for one week per year would require the Justices to interact
with local judges and members of the bar. At most, their visits
134. 2 REG. DEB. 932 (1826).
135. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., A Supreme Surprise for N.Y. Lawyers, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12,
2006, at A20, available at 2006 WLNR 17665008; Howard Mintz, Retired Justice O’Connor Helps in S.F. Court, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, at
B1, available at 2006 WLNR 18149282; Donna Walter, Eighth Circuit Appeals
Panel Examines Voting Rights, DAILY REC. (Kan. City, Mo.), Feb. 13, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 2917024.
137. See Lithwick, supra note 125; Mark Walsh, Reclusive Justice Souter
Attends N.H. Ceremony, 25 EDUC. WK., Apr. 19, 2006, at 26, available at 2006
WLNR 7497386.
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could turn into noteworthy annual events for some communities, resulting in coverage by local newspapers and social engagements open to local lawyers, judges, or even the general
public.
Other advantages of circuit riding accrue directly to the
Justices and the Court. Professors Arthur Hellman and Carolyn Shapiro have argued that the Court has become increasingly “Olympian” over the past two decades, issuing fewer opinions but granting certiorari in a relatively increasing number of
important cases that permit it to make sweeping legal rulings.138 Professor Shapiro further criticizes the Court for announcing “rules and standards [in plenary cases] often without
applying them to the factual situations from which they
arise.”139 In a dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist offered a similar
critique:
The Court, I believe, makes an even greater mistake in failing to apply its newly announced rule to the facts of this case. Instead of thus
illustrating how the rule works, it contents itself with abstractions
and paraphrases of abstractions, so that its opinion sounds much like
a treatise about cooking by someone who has never cooked before and
has no intention of starting now.140

In addition, the Justices do not have an opportunity to
watch closely the development of various areas of federal law,
primarily because the Court grants certiorari in so few cases
each year.141 Instead, the Court takes a piecemeal approach to
its supervisory function, commonly reviewing and deciding legal questions only after the lower courts have become squarely
divided. Consequently, there is rarely a unifying theme in the
138. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 433–38; Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian
Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 288 (2006).
139. See Shapiro, supra note 138, at 313–14.
140. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 269 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (“The Court
grandly declares that ‘[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial. But the thousands of federal prosecutors
and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond
the specific kinds of testimony the Court lists is covered by the new rule. They
need them now, not months or years from now.’”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in judgment) (citations omitted).
141. Arguably, reading petitions for certiorari could keep the Justices
abreast of important developments in federal law. However, at least two Justices (Stevens and Rehnquist) have admitted in the past that they do not read
most petitions for certiorari, and the Court largely leaves the initial screening
of petitions to law clerks. See Stras, supra note 133, at 46, 53, 54.
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cases the Court reviews each Term,142 and it often takes years
for an issue to resurface on the Court’s plenary docket.143 Thus,
the Justices are not regularly forced to grapple with the gaps or
inconsistencies in the Court’s contemporary opinions or the
challenges faced by lower courts in implementing them.144
A renewal of circuit riding may alleviate the problems
posed by “the Court’s current distance from the daily work of
the lower courts”145 and encourage the Justices to “become
more sensitive to administrative and jurisprudential headaches
they create for the lower courts.”146 By sitting on the lower
courts, even for a short period, the Justices would be required
to engage in the type of fact-intensive analysis of cases that is
commonplace in the lower federal courts, and to even apply the
Court’s precedents, a practice which could foster some humility
when the Justices return each October to decide an additional
batch of Supreme Court cases.147
142. Sometimes the Court does take a group of cases to clarify an area of
federal law. For instance, in 1999 the Court decided a trio of cases under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that addressed various aspects of that
law, including whether corrective or mitigating measures can be considered in
determining coverage under the ADA. See Albertson’s, Inc. v Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 558 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521
(1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
143. Although there are numerous examples of this phenomenon, one
prominent example is the lengthy, nearly twenty-year period between the
Court’s opinion in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986), and its subsequent decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.
v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005), clarifying the
standard for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for state law
claims that present questions of federal law. In the employment discrimination area, the Court took approximately fourteen years to finally resolve the
important question of whether direct evidence of discrimination is required in
mixed-motive cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compare
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270–71 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (holding that the plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination to trigger the mixed-motive analysis), with Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003) (holding that the plaintiff did not need to prove discrimination by direct evidence in mixed-motive cases).
144. See Hellman, supra note 138, at 435 (“When the Court addresses a
particular statute or doctrine only in isolated cases at long intervals, the Justices may not fully appreciate how the particular issue fits into its larger setting.”).
145. Shapiro, supra note 138, at 329.
146. Id.
147. See id. The U.S. courts of appeals, for instance, are often asked to review a district court’s grant of summary judgment or a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence. Those types of cases, as well as many others, require
circuit judges to apply and evaluate facts in making their decisions.
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Aside from humility and perspective, circuit riding would
also require the Justices to decide cases in areas of the law in
which the Court is not traditionally interested. It is no secret
that the Court rarely hears cases involving state law, yet many
cases on the Court’s plenary docket involve the type of general
common law questions for which background knowledge of
state law would prove useful. Many areas of federal law require
familiarity with the common law: ERISA cases involve common
law trust principles,148 FELA cases incorporate common law
tort doctrines,149 and cases involving sentencing enhancements
under the Armed Career Criminal Act require comparison between a state’s definition of an offense and the generic definition of an offense adopted by a majority of states.150 Although
there are numerous other examples, requiring the Justices to
decide diversity cases while sitting on the circuit courts would
improve their effectiveness when cases requiring knowledge of
general common law principles, such as ERISA and FELA
cases, appear on the Court’s plenary docket.
Riding circuit would also expose Justices to areas of federal
law over which the Court generally does not exercise plenary
review. For example, the Court has expressed doubt about
whether it should ever grant plenary review over cases involving the interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, primarily
because Congress placed in the Sentencing Commission the authority to “periodically review the work of the courts, and . . .
make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest,” including retroactive

148. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004). ERISA
is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which sets uniform standards for employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000); see Margaret
E. McLean, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Takeovers: Restraints on the Use of ESOPs by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile Takeovers, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 735–36 (1983).
149. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541–42
(1994). FELA is the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60
(2000), which makes “railroads liable for injuries or deaths suffered by their
employees in interstate commerce as a result of the negligence of the railroad’s
other employees, agents, or officers.” Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 520 (2006).
150. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990). The Supreme Court recently decided a case raising a similar issue, United States v.
Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815, 818 (2007), in which the question presented
was whether a violation of California’s vehicle-theft statute qualified as a
“theft” offense, which is a subcategory of “aggravated felon[ies]” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2000).
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changes.151 In other areas as well, such as cases involving the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has
been relatively quiet in recent years.152 Yet these are important
areas of federal law as, for instance, the Supreme Court possesses statutory responsibility for the issuance and amendment
of the various federal rules of evidence and procedure,153 and as
sentencing issues have been garnering increased attention from
academics and policymakers in recent years.154 By sitting on
the circuit courts, which regularly hear cases on the Sentencing
Guidelines and the federal rules, the Justices would both augment the breadth of their knowledge of federal law and
strengthen their ability to carry out their statutory responsibilities.155
Finally, circuit riding would encourage Justices to retire in
a timely manner, before the onset of mental or physical infirmity. For Justices who are mentally or physically infirm, increasing the workload can make the job more difficult, varied,
and exhausting, even though the new duties may not be very
challenging for Justices in good health. Mental and physical infirmity has been and inevitably will continue to be a serious
problem on the Supreme Court, and in a prior co-authored article, I even proposed a package of retirement incentives—a
“golden parachute” for Supreme Court Justices—to alleviate
the problem.156 Congress possesses other tools to encourage
timely retirement, including the power to increase the Justices’
workload by expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or by adding supplementary duties to their job de151. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991).
152. The last time the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence was approximately seven years ago.
See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
154. See, e.g., Symposium, Sentencing: Learning From, and Worrying
About, the States?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 933, 933–36 (2005); Symposium, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2005); see also Mandatory Sentencing
Is Criticized by Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1994, at A22 (“‘I simply do not
see how Congress can be satisfied with the results of mandatory minimums for
possession of crack cocaine.’” (quoting Justice Kennedy)).
155. Because the Sentencing Guidelines did not go into effect until November 1, 1987, Justices Stevens and Scalia did not hear any cases involving interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines prior to their elevation to the Supreme Court in 1975 and 1986, respectively. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2, available
at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2007).
156. Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1455–59.
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scriptions.157 As Calabresi and Presser argue, circuit riding is a
“reasonable way of accomplishing that goal.”158
Indeed, Professors David Nixon and J. David Haskin conducted a study in which they concluded that adding to judicial
workload increases the probability of retirement.159 Using each
month on the appellate court as a separate observation in their
regression analysis, Nixon and Haskin found that “personal
factors such as workload . . . are the most substantively and
statistically significant factors affecting aggregate retirements.”160 Two other empirical studies of lower court judges
confirm the relationship between workload and retirement.161
As I have written previously, “[t]hese studies suggest that increasing the workload of Justices, which in turn increases the
amount of time spent on judging rather than leisure, will make
retirement more attractive for the average Justice.”162 Accordingly, in addition to the institutional and personal benefits of
circuit riding, its renewal will also encourage mentally and
physically infirm Justices to retire in a timely manner.
B. THE CIRCUIT RIDING ACT OF 2007
Even though the practice of circuit riding began with the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has never provided much specificity with respect to the circuit duties of the Justices. For instance, the Judiciary Act of 1789 simply stated that “there shall
be held annually in each district of said circuits, two courts,
which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any
two Justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judge of
such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum.”163
In contrast, that Act exhaustively discussed the jurisdiction of

157. See id. at 1436.
158. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1415.
159. See David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial Retirement Strategies:
The Judge’s Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM.
POL. Q. 458, 471–72 (2000).
160. See id. at 480. The authors measured judicial workload by calculating
the “the number of case filings per judge.” Id. at 466.
161. See Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of
Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts, 1900–1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 469 (1990);
James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 590
(1995).
162. Stras, supra note 12, at 1437.
163. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 4, 1 Stat. 74–75.
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the Supreme Court, the old circuit courts, and the district
courts.164
To avoid the lack of guidance accompanying past legislation, I recommend that Congress enact my proposed circuit riding legislation, the Circuit Riding Act of 2007. The Act carefully
delineates the additional requirements that would be placed on
the Justices. First, rather than requiring them to conduct trials
at the district court level, as Calabresi and Presser have recently proposed, the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 calls for the Justices to spend five days (or about one work week) per year sitting on panels of the U.S. courts of appeals. Second, the
proposed Act ensures that Justices sit with as many different
panels and judges as possible during their brief circuit riding
visits, while accommodating the prevailing practice of some circuits to have one panel sit together for an entire week of hearings. Third, the Act makes clear that the Justices’ additional
circuit duties will not interfere with their Court obligations because the requirements of the Act may only be satisfied during
the summer months when the Court is in recess.165 Fourth, the
Act expressly provides for the payment of reasonable expenses
incurred by the Justices while riding circuit, including lodging
and transportation, and augments their existing salaries to
compensate them for the additional work required by the
Act.166
The Circuit Riding Act of 2007 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 42)
(a) The Chief Justice of the United States and the associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall from time to
time be allotted as circuit Justices among the circuits by
164. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text.
165. If there are circuits that do not regularly schedule oral argument sessions during the summer months, then the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would
require them to annually schedule at least a single panel of the court of appeals during the months of July, August, or September, which is at most a minor imposition.
166. The payment of additional compensation to the Justices avoids any
serious argument that Congress has unconstitutionally diminished the Justices’ salaries, even though any such argument would likely be doomed to failure anyway. The Constitution, by its terms, does not require that federal
judges receive supplementary compensation for additional duties or work, only
that their salaries not be diminished during their continuance in office. See
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office”); Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1419–21.

STRAS_6FMT

1736

6/15/2007 10:56:18 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1710

order of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice may
make such allotments in vacation. A Justice may be assigned to more than one circuit, and two or more Justices may be assigned to the same circuit.167
(b) The Chief Justice of the United States and the associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall participate in
the work of the United States Courts of Appeals in the
following manner:
(1) The Chief Justice and the associate Justices shall
each participate in one or more panels of the United
States Courts of Appeals for a minimum of five days
each year;
(2) Justices assigned to two circuits pursuant to this
section shall spend a minimum of five days sitting on
each circuit to which they are assigned over every
two-year period;
(3) Justices assigned to a single circuit pursuant to
this section shall spend a minimum of five days sitting on the circuit to which they are assigned and a
minimum of five days on another circuit over every
two-year period;
(4) These duties may be performed at any time between July 1 and October 1 of each year, as agreed to
by each Justice and respective circuit;
(5) In no circumstance shall a Justice sit with the
same judge for more than five days in any two-year
period;
(6) No more than one Justice may sit on a panel in
order to fulfill the requirements of this section;
(7) The Justices are ineligible to vote on or participate in an en banc rehearing of any case decided by
the Courts of Appeals, but are eligible to vote for

167. Subsection (a) mirrors the language of the current 28 U.S.C. § 42. The
remainder of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 is new and thus would require legislative action. Supreme Court Rules 21 and 22 govern the in-chambers practices of the Supreme Court with respect to motions and stay applications, including the duties of Circuit Justices. SUP. CT. R. 21, 22.
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panel rehearing if they were a member of the original panel that heard the case;
(8) Participation by the Justices through video arguments or teleconferencing shall not fulfill the requirements of this section.
(c) The chief judge of each circuit shall be responsible for
scheduling cases and panels so that the Justices may
fulfill the requirements of this section.
(d) Provision shall be made for payment of reasonable
travel, lodging, and other expenses incurred by the Justices in fulfilling the requirements of this section.
(e) The annual salaries of the Justices shall be adjusted
to provide $3000 in additional compensation for each
day a Justice sits on a panel of the United States Court
of Appeals.
C. THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGES OF THE CIRCUIT RIDING ACT OF
2007
A modern circuit riding proposal must consider both the
individual competencies of members of the Court and the
strengths and limitations of the courts that would host the Justices. Calabresi and Presser would require Justices to spend
four weeks per year conducting trials and performing the work
of a district judge.168 While the Justices would no doubt benefit
from the experience of serving as trial judges, the modern realities and demands of litigation render that proposal impractical.
By contrast, the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 is closely tailored to
the strengths of the Justices and the competencies of the circuit
courts by focusing the Justices’ efforts on the familiar demands
of appellate adjudication rather than the vagaries of trial litigation.
The role of a federal district judge today differs dramatically from the days when Justices rode circuit. During the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in particular, litigation in
federal courts centered around a “trial-based procedure” in
which the district judge or circuit judge (of the old circuit
courts) served as an impartial adjudicator of disputes.169 In
168. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1388–89.
169. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil
Process, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 631, 639; see also Paul D. Carrington, A New Con-
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criminal cases, for example, jurors might sit “for not one but a
whole series of trials” and most trials were “over within a day,”
with many ending even “within an hour.”170 Today, by contrast,
the median time from filing to final judgment in a criminal case
is fourteen months when a defendant receives a jury trial.171
The nature of federal litigation on the civil side has also
changed dramatically in recent years, particularly since the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
The Rules “interposed a number of new steps between the
commencement of litigation and trial, each of which could yield
a judicial ruling and thus require judicial time.”172 Federal district judges are now required to assume a “managerial” role in
the conduct of civil litigation,173 in which the pretrial process
rather than the trial itself is the “main event.”174 These pretrial
tasks, comprising a significant part of the civil work of district
judges, include “ruling on discovery disputes, deciding joinder
issues, conducting pretrial and settlement conferences, and . . .
punishing lawyers for misbehavior.”175 After the plaintiff files a
complaint, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss or for a
change of venue, and then the parties may conduct discovery
that can last for months or even years.176 At the conclusion of
the discovery phase, one or both parties may file a motion for
summary judgment, and then it may be months before a trial
commences. In the twelve-month period ending September 30,
federacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 932–44 (1996)
(examining the changing role of federal district courts from the nineteenth to
the twentieth century).
170. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 692 (2004). Friedman’s study contained many generalizations about litigation prior to the twentieth century and did not distinguish
between federal and state trials.
171. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 255 tbl.D6 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2005/appendices/d6.pdf. For cases ending in dismissal the median is 6.2
months, while the median duration of a bench trial is approximately 7.3
months. See id.
172. Yeazell, supra note 169, at 639.
173. See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 378–79
(1982) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have shifted the role
of judges from adjudicators to managers of litigation).
174. Judith Resnick, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming
the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000).
175. Yeazell, supra note 169, at 639.
176. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 511 (1986) (noting that, although not typical,
some cases take months to complete discovery).
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2005, civil cases concluding before trial usually took around
thirteen months from the time of filing.177 Civil cases that
reached trial took even longer—approximately twenty-two
months from the date of filing until final judgment.178
For both criminal and civil cases, the district courts would
have difficulty accommodating Justices for a finite period of
only four weeks each year.179 Even if it is unnecessary for the
Justices to manage a case from beginning to end, there are few
activities (other than a trial) that would provide meaningful
experience for the Justices over such a brief period. Moreover,
because of the increased emphasis on managing a case from the
beginning, Justices would be at a significant disadvantage if
they were asked to conduct a trial without being involved in the
pretrial process.180 And even the comparatively simple task of
sentencing criminal defendants requires some familiarity with
the factual context of each case, which is often gained through
a judge’s participation in the guilt phase of a trial. The lag between the guilt and sentencing phases of many criminal trials
would make even this routine assignment difficult for circuit-

177. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 171, at
188 tbl.C5.
178. See id. In 1963, by contrast, the median interval between filing and
final judgment in a civil trial was just sixteen months. See Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 480–81 fig.13 (2004).
179. As a result, it is far too simplistic to argue that Justices today can
conduct trials because “famous Justices from John Marshall to Stephen Field
rode circuit and tried cases.” Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1408.
180. Indeed, the Court has made a similar point regarding its role in the
trial of cases under the Court’s original jurisdiction: “This Court is . . . structured to perform as an appellate tribunal, ill-equipped for the task of factfinding and so forced, in original cases, awkwardly to play the role of fact
finder without actually presiding over the introduction of evidence.” Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971).
To be sure, then-Justice William Rehnquist presided over a federal trial in
Richmond, Virginia, in 1984, and the district court appeared to have no problem accommodating his presence. See Aaron Epstein, Cameras to Capture the
Elusive Rehnquist, N.J. RECORD, Jan. 7, 1999, at A8. In an interesting turn of
events, however, the Fourth Circuit later reversed Justice Rehnquist’s decision to permit the case to go forward to trial. See Chief Justice’s Other Trial
Was Overturned, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 2, 1999, at A14. It is unclear the extent
to which Rehnquist’s unfamiliarity with the background of the case made the
task more difficult for him, and whether such unfamiliarity contributed to the
case’s reversal in the Fourth Circuit. It bears mentioning, however, that few
modern Justices have presided over trials. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note
17, at 1406.
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riding Justices.181 Put simply, it would be extremely difficult,
perhaps even an outright waste of judicial resources, for district courts to isolate and assign discrete aspects of civil and
criminal cases to the Justices, and such an approach is unlikely
to result in much meaningful experience for the Justices.182
In contrast to the district courts, the federal circuit courts
can readily accommodate the participation of Supreme Court
Justices. In most cases before the courts of appeals, the factual
record has been fully developed and the legal issues have been
considerably narrowed. Moreover, appeals are ordinarily more
predictable than trials, as oral arguments are often scheduled
weeks or months in advance, the parties are usually not able to
alter the hearing date through strategic maneuvering, and the
record and briefs are available to members of the panel prior to
the hearing. In addition, Justices would be able to prepare in
advance by reviewing the briefs, record, and any applicable
federal and state cases. Prior to oral argument, the Justices can
even discuss the issues in a particular case, if necessary, with
other members of the panel through electronic mail, letters, or
telephone calls. Moreover, by conversing with other members of
appellate panels, the Justices would encounter a greater variety of viewpoints and personalities than they would by performing their work alone in the district courts as Calabresi and
Presser propose.183
181. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J.
951, 1004–05 n.188 (2003) (noting that in the federal courts the preparation of
pre-sentence investigation reports results in the sentencing hearing “tak[ing]
place several weeks or even months after the verdict or guilty plea”). Of
course, a criminal case that ends in a plea agreement would likely allow the
Justices sufficient time to participate in the sentencing of a defendant. However, such a truncated process is unlikely to result in the type of meaningful
trial experience advocated by Calabresi and Presser.
182. A circuit riding plan requiring the Justices to handle just a few cases
each year, but not setting a finite time limit for their participation in the work
of the district courts, would avoid many of the problems associated with
Calabresi and Presser’s plan. An open-ended proposal lacking firm time limits,
however, would likely have the unfortunate consequence of interfering with
the Justices’ work obligations on the Supreme Court as their circuit riding duties would linger into the Court’s Term.
183. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the old circuit courts included appeals from
the decisions of district courts in certain types of cases. See supra notes 23–24
and accompanying text. Moreover, one of the benefits of the early circuit riding
system was that the Justices were exposed to district court judges while sitting on three-judge panels. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. The
Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would further emphasize that advantage by having
the Justices sit with two lower court judges on each panel, rather than just one
district judge as required under the Judiciary Act of 1789.
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The work that often lingers after a hearing before the
courts of appeals—such as the drafting of opinions and substantive discussions among members of a panel—would be
unlikely to interfere with the Justices’ obligations to the Supreme Court. Most of the interaction among members of an appellate panel occurs immediately after oral argument when the
judges decide the outcome of the cases during conference, and
any subsequent communications are often in the form of electronic mail, including circulated draft opinions. Unlike trial
work, performing the functions of a circuit judge would not require the Justices to maintain a physical presence, other than
during the hearings. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe
that the Justices would not be able to participate fully in the
work of the courts of appeals while simultaneously discharging
their duties to the Supreme Court.184
In addition to the aforementioned issues of institutional
competency, the Justices are also not particularly well-suited
for trial court work either. Of the present members of the Supreme Court, only Justice Souter has any experience as a trial
judge,185 and none has experience as a federal district judge. In
addition, only Justice Alito has spent any appreciable time as a
federal prosecutor, and it not clear whether any of the other
Justices tried cases during their pre-judicial careers. Moreover,
senior Justices such as Sandra Day O’Connor have overwhelmingly elected to participate in panels of the U.S. courts of appeals rather than sit as district judges.186 In sum, the Justices’
184. Although it is a minor point, the courts of appeals are also better
equipped than the district courts to accommodate the Justices’ physical presence. Most appellate courtrooms have at least three seats on the bench, with
some having more to accommodate an en banc argument. Indeed, senior Justices have regularly sat by designation on the courts of appeals without much
difficulty. In contrast, trial work would require either the temporary use of an
empty courtroom or for one of the existing district court judges to temporarily
abandon or share his courtroom. It is also possible that the Justices’ participation in the work of the district courts would require the hiring of additional (or
at least the sharing of ) court personnel, such as marshals, court reporters, and
courtroom deputies.
185. Justice Souter spent five years as a New Hampshire Superior Court
judge prior to becoming a Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. See 5
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1809 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997).
186. For example, Lexis searches of the judicial activities of three senior
Justices revealed that they sat exclusively on the courts of appeals. The search
dates were taken from the date of each Justice’s retirement until their death
(and until April 17, 2007 in the case of Justice O’Connor). The search terms
were JUDGES (full name of the judge including middle initial). The results
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pre-judicial careers and post-retirement activities do not suggest that they would be comfortable or competent to perform
the work of district judges.
Calabresi and Presser argue, however, that one of the primary advantages of their proposal is that the Justices would
acquire new skills by learning “more about how trial courts actually work and about what is happening on the front lines of
our court system.”187 While I share Calabresi and Presser’s
view that the Justices should become more knowledgeable
about the trial process, I remain unconvinced that spending
four weeks a year as a district judge is the only means of
achieving that objective. Unlike the certiorari process before
the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals exercise mandatory
appellate jurisdiction over a wide range of cases and issues,
many of which would expose the Justices to the nuances of trial
practice. For instance, deciding cases involving whether a district court’s grant of summary judgment is appropriate,
whether a sentence for a criminal defendant is reasonable, or
whether a district court abuses its discretion in the admission
of evidence, all of which are issues that the Supreme Court
generally ignores,188 would educate the Justices about the issues facing the district courts without placing them in the
awkward position of performing tasks for which they are arguably unqualified.189 Indeed, as Judge Posner has observed,
“[t]he position of a court of appeals judge provides a good vantage point for evaluating the work of district judges.”190 Accordwere as follows: Justice O’Connor has sat on a total of fifteen cases in the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits since her retirement on January 31, 2006;
Justice Byron White sat on a total of seventy-four cases in the Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth circuits between June 28, 1993, and April 15, 2002; Justice
Tom Clark sat on 338 cases in several circuits between June 12, 1967, and
June 13, 1977. The searches turned up no instances of a Justice sitting as a
district judge.
187. Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1408.
188. These types of cases, unless the lower court misstates or incorrectly
decides an issue of law, tend to be denied because they involve “erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” See SUP.
CT. R. 10.
189. I also question whether four weeks per year is sufficient time for the
Justices to become fully acquainted with the trial process. Because most cases
before the district courts last for months or even years, circuit-riding Justices
would manage only discrete aspects of a case, and then only for a month each
year. See supra notes 169–82 and accompanying text. Mastering the myriad of
tasks that the district courts face, however, can take months or even years of
experience. See Resnick, supra note 173, at 391–413.
190. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
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ingly, considerations of institutional and individual competency
favor a proposal, such as the Circuit Riding Act of 2007, requiring the Justices to spend one week per year participating in the
work of the U.S. courts of appeals rather than performing the
unfamiliar duties of a district judge.
D. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CIRCUIT RIDING ACT OF 2007
Despite the numerous advantages from a renewal of circuit
riding, skeptics of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 could raise a
number of potential objections. First, although the constitutionality of circuit riding has been settled for over two hundred
years, the paucity of analysis from the Court in Stuart v.
Laird191 could encourage litigants to renew some of the original
questions about the constitutionality of the practice. Second, as
with earlier attacks on the circuit riding, some may argue that
its renewal would take the Justices away from their substantial
Court obligations and render it more difficult for them to keep
up with the demands of their offices. Third, skeptics may argue
that the advantages discussed in Parts II.A and II.C are largely
illusory, or point to insurmountable political barriers in reinstituting a modern form of circuit riding.
As discussed above, circuit riding raises a number of interesting constitutional questions that the Court considered and
ultimately rejected in Stuart. Although none of the arguments
were specifically addressed in any detail, the Court concluded
that “acquiescence” and “practice” under the circuit riding system for a number of years had fixed its constitutionality.192 The
Circuit Riding Act of 2007 arguably implicates two of the constitutional objections raised by the parties in Stuart.
Litigants may first argue that having the Justices sit on
the courts of appeals for even one week per year violates the
Appointments Clause because the new duties would be inconsistent with their appointment as Justices of the Supreme
Court. Under the Supreme Court’s prevailing case law, Congress may add duties to an office, but those new duties must be
germane.193 As I have explained previously, even the onerous
form of circuit riding practiced at the end of the eighteenth cen336 (1996).
191. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
192. See id. at 305.
193. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174–75 (1994) (applying a
germaneness standard to an Appointments Clause challenge to military officers sitting as military judges).
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tury was constitutional because it added only germane judicial
duties to the office of a Supreme Court Justice.194 The Circuit
Riding Act of 2007 would require the Justices to spend only one
week per year sitting on panels of the courts of appeals, which
is far less burdensome than the months of circuit riding that
were required by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Moreover, requiring
Justices to sit on the lower federal courts is a classic example of
downward designation, which is the least constitutionally problematic form of judicial designation.195 Thus, to find the Circuit
Riding Act of 2007 unconstitutional arguably would draw into
doubt the ability of a federal judge at any level of the judicial
hierarchy to sit by designation (upward, lateral, or downward)
on any other lower federal court, a longstanding practice that
has become an integral tool in coping with the mounting workloads in the lower federal courts.196 Finally, the character of the
added duties—judicial work in the lower federal courts197—is
surely germane for many of the reasons discussed in this Article, most notably the exposure that the Justices would receive
to areas of federal law that are largely neglected on the Supreme Court’s plenary docket.198
194. See Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1408, 1416–17.
195. See id. at 1417–18.
196. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 795 (2004) (listing
the thousands of cases decided by each circuit from 1982 to 2004 that involved
a judge sitting by designation); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges
Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 351, 359–63 (1995) (examining the widespread use of district court
judges sitting by designation on the courts of appeals as a result of increased
caseloads).
If hearing cases on the lower federal courts is nongermane to the office of
a Supreme Court Justice, then arguably any federal judge who sits on a court
to which she was not appointed would be participating in a violation of the
Appointments Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The counterargument, of
course, is that the “supreme Court” is specifically referred to in the Constitution, while all other federal courts are mentioned only under the “one-size fits
all” category of the “inferior Courts.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. art. III,
§ 1. A corollary of that argument is that Justices of the Supreme Court occupy
distinct offices from judges of the inferior courts. See Stras & Scott, supra note
12, at 1409–10. Consequently, striking down the power of Supreme Court Justices to sit on the lower courts would have only indirect bearing on the interchangeability of federal judges at other levels of the judicial hierarchy. Resolution of this difficult question, however, is beyond the scope of this Article and
merits a separate discussion of its own.
197. Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1416 n.98.
198. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of sentencing, procedural, and evidentiary issues.

STRAS_6FMT

2007]

6/15/2007 10:56:18 AM

SUPREME COURT REFORM

1745

A second, more troublesome argument is that litigants who
appear before a panel with a Supreme Court Justice may later
be deprived of nine unbiased Justices in a hearing before the
Supreme Court.199 During the early years of circuit riding, Attorney General Edmund Randolph raised this issue as an important cost of circuit riding.200 Two outcomes are possible if
such a case is placed on the plenary docket of the Supreme
Court: (1) an arguably biased Justice hears the case if she refuses to recuse herself; or (2) the affected Justice recuses herself, but leaves the Court with only eight qualified members to
hear the case. While the latter option removes any specter of
bias,201 it does raise the possibility that a greater number of
cases could be affirmed by an equally divided Court, in which
the Court affirms the lower court decision in a one- or two-line
per curiam opinion.202 Cases affirmed by an equally divided
court tend to waste the Court’s time and resources and leave
the lower courts in continued disarray with respect to the issues over which the Court granted certiorari.203
The probability is remote, however, that a renewal of circuit riding would cause the Court to suddenly face a large num-

199. A closely related issue is whether the members of an appellate panel
would be more deferential to the views of a sitting Supreme Court Justice, giving the circuit riding Justice too much influence over the decisions reached by
the panel. See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 306 (2006) (discussing small group theory, in which “status
in the group matters to decisionmaking and that ‘the individual who feels inferior and needs approval will, in the group context, behave in a conforming
manner’” (quoting S. SIDNEY ULMER, COURTS AS SMALL AND NOT SO SMALL
GROUPS 13 (1971))). It is unclear, however, how the presence of a Supreme
Court Justice would affect the behavioral dynamics of an appellate panel because, in the usual circumstance, a judge sitting by designation on a court of
appeals is either from an equivalent or lower level of the federal judicial hierarchy. See id. at 306–07.
200. See Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney General to the House
of Representatives (Dec. 27, 1790), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 23 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834).
201. Although the decisions of the Justices on recusal issues were far from
uniform under the old circuit riding system, many did eventually recuse themselves from consideration of cases that they heard before the circuit courts. See
Stras & Scott, supra note 12, at 1416 n.97. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall
recused himself from the Court’s consideration of Stuart v. Laird for that very
reason. Id.; see also Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 (1803).
202. See, e.g., Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S.
99 (2002); Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret.
Sys. v. Felzen, 525 U.S. 315 (1999).
203. See Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an
Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 82–83 (2005).
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ber of cases in which the outcome would be decided by an
equally divided Court. As an initial matter, the courts of appeals have terminated on the merits between 27,000 and
30,000 cases during each year between 2000 and 2005.204 Many
of those cases were undoubtedly decided by screening panels or
some other similar mechanism. However, over the past six
years, the number of cases receiving an oral argument before
the courts of appeals (excluding the Federal Circuit) has ranged
from a low of 8645 cases in 2004 to 9752 cases in 2000.205 Of
those cases, the Supreme Court grants plenary consideration to
about seventy-six to eighty cases per year, or roughly 0.9% of
the cases receiving a full hearing before the courts of appeals.206 If the Justices ride circuit for one week each year, they
will in total have participated in approximately 225 lower court
decisions, assuming that each panel hears about five cases per
day.207 That figure is so small that it is unlikely that more than
a handful of cases raising recusal questions will appear on the
Court’s plenary docket each Term.208 Of that handful of cases,
an even smaller percentage would result in an equally divided
Court.209 As Ryan Black and Lee Epstein have observed,
“equally divided cases are relatively rare occurrences.”210 Of the
1,319 cases in which an equally divided court was a possibility
during the 1946 to 2003 Terms, the Court was deadlocked in
204. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, http://www
.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
205. See id.
206. The Supreme Court issued an average of eighty “opinions of the court”
between 2001 and 2005. These statistics were obtained from the Harvard Law
Review’s annual “The Statistics” section. See The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV.
372, 380 (2006).
207. Most, if not all, of the circuits assign the cases heard by panels in a
random fashion. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Agree to Disagree, WASH. MONTHLY,
Sept. 2003, at 56, 57; Dov B. Fischer, Short-Circuiting Justice, WKLY. STANDARD, May 27, 2002, at 15, 16. Accordingly, the cases heard by the Justices are
unlikely to be either more difficult or have greater saliency (except by random
chance) than those heard by other panels of a circuit.
208. In fact, assuming a 0.9% rate of plenary review by the Supreme Court
for cases receiving a full hearing before the courts of appeals, approximately
two additional Supreme Court cases per Term (or 0.9% multiplied by 225
cases) would involve a recusal issue.
209. Based on the historical numbers calculated by Black and Epstein, the
Circuit Riding Act of 2007 can be expected to produce an additional case involving an equally divided Court about once every seven years. See Black &
Epstein, supra note 203, at 86–94.
210. Id. at 85. Black and Epstein also found that the data “run contrary to
[the] common belief ” that discretionary recusals “lead to an appreciable increase in . . . plurality opinions.” Id. at 94.
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only seventy-four cases, or in about six percent of the cases in
which a tie was possible.211 Based on these statistics, it appears
unlikely that the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would result in a
materially greater number of cases in which the outcome of a
case would be decided by an equally divided Court.
Skeptics may further argue that the advantages of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 are largely illusory because all of the
current Justices previously served on a U.S. court of appeals.212
Indeed, in light of the failed nomination of Harriet Miers in
2005, it appears that prior circuit court experience is an increasingly important, perhaps even essential, credential for
Supreme Court nominees.213 But prior judicial experience by no
means eliminates the need for circuit riding. To the contrary,
each of the Justices would benefit from regular exposure to different courts and judges, as well as to the types of cases commonly heard by the courts of appeals—call it continuing legal
education (CLE) for Supreme Court Justices.214 As stated
above, the Supreme Court’s plenary docket is highly limited, in
terms of both the number and types of cases, and does not include cases involving highly factbound issues, pure questions of
state law, or interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, all of

211. Id. at 85–86. As the authors point out, the percentages were slightly
higher for the Rehnquist Court, in which the Court deadlocked in about 8.11%
of the cases in which a tie was possible. Id. at 86.
Although they do not answer the question, Epstein and Black float a
number of possible reasons for the surprisingly low number of cases decided by
an equally divided Court. One possibility is that one or more Justices may
change their votes for institutional reasons so as to avoid the negative consequences flowing from a decision made by an equally divided Court. See id. at
96. Another possibility is purely strategic: a Justice might “cast a ‘sophisticated’ vote (in an apparent four-to-four case) to avoid a future decision that
may be even more distant from her policy preferences,” as questions left undecided by an evenly divided Court increase the temptation in the next case to
renew the battle all over again. Id. It is also possible that the Justices refuse
to recuse themselves in cases in which they think a split Court might result.
See id.
212. See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
213. See INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 5, 2007, at A2; Politics This Week,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 85.
214. Unlike for other active federal judges, there appears to be no statutory
authorization for the Chief Justice to designate active Supreme Court Justices
to sit by designation on the lower federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 291 (2000)
(circuit judges); 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2000) (district judges); 28 U.S.C. § 294 (2000)
(retired Supreme Court Justices, circuit judges, and district judges).
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which are staples on the dockets of the lower federal courts.215
And, of course, the current Justices, nearly all of whom have
not sat by designation on a lower federal court, have not grappled with the application of binding Supreme Court opinions in
cases that they themselves had a hand in crafting. Furthermore, three of the Justices, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Souter, and Justice Thomas, enjoyed tenures on the courts of
appeals of less than three years, while two others, Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia, have not sat on a lower federal court in
more than twenty years.216 Those five, because of their abbreviated or dated service to the circuit courts, would likely gain
the most from circuit riding.
Still others may argue that increasing the Supreme Court’s
plenary docket is a more pressing workload concern. As I have
noted previously, the Supreme Court’s plenary docket has declined sharply over the past two decades, from a high of 153
signed opinions in 1986 to just seventy-four signed opinions in
both the 2002 and 2003 Terms.217 I agree that the Supreme
Court should hear additional cases, and I propose elsewhere a
certification procedure that is aimed at accomplishing that objective.218 But many of the benefits of circuit riding are exclusive. For example, it is unlikely that increasing the size of the
Supreme Court’s plenary docket would result in the Justices
hearing a greater number of cases involving state law or the
Sentencing Guidelines, and it certainly would not provide them
with greater exposure to other judges, courts, and communities.219 Moreover, with at least four law clerks allotted to every
Justice and the presence of numerous support staff at the Supreme Court, there is no reason to believe that Justices cannot
handle both a larger plenary docket and the limited, additional
circuit duties proposed in the Circuit Riding Act of 2007.220
215. See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 212.
217. See Stras, supra note 133, at 21–22.
218. See David R. Stras, Opening the Doors to the Supreme Court: A Solution to the Declining Plenary Docket (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
219. See supra Part II.A.
220. It can be argued that the workload of today’s Supreme Court is much
lighter than during the middle to end of the nineteenth century. During the
1850s, the Court issued an average of 86.1 signed opinions per Term, slightly
larger than the output of the current Court, and that number nearly quadrupled to an average of 265.7 signed opinions per Term in the 1880s. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 232–36 tbl.3-3. Moreover, until the 1880s, none
of the Justices had law clerks, and the Justices regularly rode circuit for sev-
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A closely related objection is that a renewal of circuit riding could exact non-trivial opportunity costs on the Justices, including interfering with their ability to complete their obligations to the Supreme Court. Perhaps circuit riding would also
limit the other public appearances of the Justices, such as visits
to law schools to give speeches or to judge moot court competitions. If the Justices were currently spending their summers
laboring over the Court’s business or visiting law schools, then
this objection would hold substantial weight. However, as
Calabresi and Presser point out, some Justices like Anthony
Kennedy “spend their summers abroad in Europe,”221 while
others such as John Paul Stevens have “plenty of time to engage in leisurely activities” during the summer months.222 Even
then-attorney and now-Chief Justice John Roberts has weighed
in on the matter, stating in a memorandum that “it is true that
only Supreme Court Justices and schoolchildren are expected
to and do take the entire summer off.”223
While the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 would require Justices to spend only a single week in residence with the courts of
appeals, it is true that their responsibilities under the Act could
span a longer period. The Justices would presumably wish to
review the briefs prior to oral argument (although the level of
preparation would vary by Justice), and the completion of opinion assignments from each sitting would require substantial
additional work. But the burdens for the Justices in carrying
out the duties required by the Act are related—even necessary—to reaping the advantages from circuit riding discussed
in Part II.A, such as having the Justices grapple with unfamiliar legal issues and interact with new sets of judges with differing viewpoints and experiences.224 Even so, it is difficult to
imagine that the duties required by the Circuit Riding Act of

eral months each year under difficult conditions. See Stras, supra note 133, at
950–51. Even with the massive increase in the number of petitions for certiorari in recent years, it would be difficult to say that today’s Justices work
harder than the Justices who served during the last half of the nineteenth
century.
221. Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1387.
222. See id. at 1414.
223. Jesse J. Holland, Roberts: Use Care with Religion, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 20, 2005, at A17, available at 2005 WLNR 13109076.
224. See supra notes 138–55 and accompanying text. Moreover, the amount
of work for each of the Justices would depend in large part on the amount of
work each delegates to her clerks, which varies widely by chambers. See Stras,
supra note 133, at 6, 17–18.
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2007 would eliminate more than half of the Justices’ lengthy
summer vacations, and often much less, leaving them ample
time for their other leisurely pursuits.
Finally, although not technically a policy objection, skeptics may argue that passage of the Circuit Riding Act of 2007 is
unrealistic because there is no movement afoot to reform the
Supreme Court. An excellent example of this difficulty is the
history of circuit riding itself, because it took nearly 120 years,
numerous proposals from Congress, and constant complaints
from the Justices to abolish it. Although the legal academy has
become increasingly interested in exploring institutional reform of the Supreme Court, as reflected by two prominent academic conferences over the past two years,225 I am presently
unaware of any proposals in Congress advocating major institutional change. It is unlikely that any members of Congress
were elected solely on promises to reform the Supreme Court,
or that such reform is high on their list of legislative goals.
Nonetheless, a renewal of circuit riding is a far less objectionable reform measure than other recent proposals that have received extensive media coverage, such as a constitutional
amendment proposing term limits for Supreme Court Justices226 and wide-reaching jurisdiction-stripping legislation.227
225. Professors Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton sponsored a conference at Duke University Law School in 2005 that resulted in a collection of essays published by Carolina Academic Press. REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton eds., 2005). In addition, the Minnesota Law Review sponsored a symposium in October 2005 entitled, “The Future of the Supreme Court: Institutional Reform and Beyond,” in which ten leading scholars discussed the
prospects for institutional reform of the Supreme Court. See David R. Stras &
Karla Vehrs, Foreword: The Future of the Supreme Court: Institutional Reform
and Beyond, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1148–53 (2006).
226. See, e.g., Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2006, at
29; Fred Graham, In Need of Review: Life Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court,
USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 2006, at 11A; Linda Greenhouse, How Long is Too Long
for the Court’s Justices?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 45.
227. See Calabresi & Presser, supra note 17, at 1416 (“Reinstituting circuit
riding is far less controversial than passing jurisdiction-stripping bills . . . .”);
Butch Mabin, Ginsburg: Federal Judiciary’s Historic Role Under Siege, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr. 8, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 6166709 (quoting
Justice Ginsburg as saying that jurisdiction-stripping bills have failed because
“[i]t is easier to block enactment of a bill than to get a bill enacted”); Rule of
Law in U.S. Requires an Independent Judiciary, TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.),
Oct. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 170002395 (“Bills have been filed in
Congress involving ‘jurisdiction stripping’ on other subjects—for instance,
eliminating the court’s ability to rule on such issues as the wording of the
Pledge of Allegiance or the public display of the Ten Commandments.”).
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With the academy’s recent interest in the Supreme Court as an
institution, it is my hope that a greater number of proposals for
institutional change will be generated, and that pressure will
mount to have a real debate in Congress about the future of the
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary.
CONCLUSION
Circuit riding for Supreme Court Justices is as old as the
federal judiciary itself and has a storied history that spans this
country’s first 120 years. Yet little academic commentary exists
on it, and only one other scholarly piece has explored its renewal. With the size of the Supreme Court’s plenary docket falling in recent years to levels not seen since the mid-1800s, it is
time to consider the reintroduction of circuit riding. As this Article suggests, there are numerous benefits to the general public, the Court, and particularly the Justices that would result
from a renewal of circuit riding. Moreover, these benefits can be
attained in a reasonable and workable manner. Many of the
policy objections that prompted circuit riding’s abolition are no
longer concerns for today’s Court, and a proposal that requires
Justices to perform work on the U.S. courts of appeals matches
the competencies of both the Justices and the courts on which
they would sit. In a time when the Court as an institution has
become increasingly cloistered in Washington, D.C., a renewal
of circuit riding would reverse that trend by exposing the Justices to a number of other judges, communities, and areas of
the law.

